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ARE INTERIM CERTIFICATES FOR THE BONDS OF A FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT NEGOTIABLE ?-Hundreds of millions of dollars of for-

eign bonds will be floated in this country during the next fifty years
to enable the European governments to adjust obligations contracted
during the World War. For almost a century it has been the practice of bankers negotiating such bond issues to put out interim
certificates pending the preparation and issue of the definitive bonds
by the government in question. These certificates generally certify
that the bearer will be entitled to a definitive bond after receipt
thereof from the goiernment. It is at once apparent of what far
reaching consequences is a decision as to the negotiability of these
interim certificates.
In I92O, J. P. Morgan & Co. and the Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York, by a contract with the Belgian government, were made
its fiscal agents for the purpose of negotiating a loan of $50,000,000,
to be raised by an issue of bonds. The bankers agreed to endeavor
to form a syndicate to offer the bonds to the public, and, during the
life of such syndicate, to use their best efforts to obtain subscriptions
for the entire amount The form of the bonds was agreed upon but,
pending their preparation and issue, two temporary bonds for the
whole amount, to be cancelled on receipt of the definitive bonds, were
issued to the bankers and they were to be at liberty to issue in their
own names interim certificates, evidencing the right of the holder to
receive an amount in bonds as therein specified. When the syndicate
was formed the Belgian government was to be credited immediately
with the entire amount of the issue. Pursuant to this contract circulars were immediately distributed by the bankers, as agents of the Belgian government and in its name, inviting public subscriptions to the
bonds, and the interim certificates were issued in the following form:
"This is to certify that the bearer is entitled to receive a bond for one
thousand dollars principal amount, of the kingdom of Belgium
twenty-five-year external gold loan 7329 sinking fund redeemable
bonds... when, as, and if delivered to us in definitive form by the
obligor, and upon surrender of and in exchange for this certificate
. subject, however, to the provisions following: If the bond deliverable hereunder be not delivered prior to Dec. I, 1920, the interest
thereon due on that date, will be paid upon presentation and surrender
of the annexed warrant, provided moneys for the payment of interest
on the bonds of the issue shall have been received by the undersigned
from the obligor... (signed) J. P. Morgan & Co." Three of these
certificates were stolen from their owner and delivered to the plaintiff bank which took them for value and in good faith. J. P. Morgan
& Co. refused upon demand to exchange bonds for the certificates
because of notice of the theft and the plaintiff thereupon brought
an action for their value. The New York Court of Appeals held,
by a unanimous decision, that the certificates were not negotiable and
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that the plaintiff had received no better title than its transferor had
and therefore affirmed the judgment of the lower court for the defendant.' The decision was based upon three grounds: i. That the
facts of the case do not bring it within Goodwin v. Robarts 2 the
leading English authority on the negotiability of this general type of
instruments. 2. That interim certificates are within the purview of
the Negotiable InstrumentsLaw and must satisfy its prerequisites for
negotiability, which the certificates in question fail to do. 3.Assuming that the case does come within the case of Goodwin v. Robarts
and is not covered by the Negotiable Instruments Law, yet the plaintiff failed to make satisfactory proof of a commercial usage to treat
the particular type of interim certificate in question as negotiable.
As far as can be gathered, the court distinguished the case of
Goodwin v. Robarts upon four grounds: (a) The interim certificates
in the latter case were signed by the bankers, who floated the loan,
with the descriptive word "agents." (b) They were the obligations
of the Russian government and not of the bankers. (c) The interest
warrant annexed to the certificate contained an absolute undertaking
to pay the interest and was not conditional, as in the principal case,
upon the receipt of moneys therefor from the government. (d) The
certificates in the Goodwin case really amounted to provisional and
informal bonds exchangeable for formal bonds thereafter. Now as
to point (a) the court does not seem to have been accurately informed,
the interim certificates probably having been confused with the bonds.
The latter instruments were signed "Agents N. M. Rothschild," but to
the interim certificates the bankers subscribed their signature unqualified by any descriptive words whatever. 3 As to point (b), when the
1
2

Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 15o N. E. 594 (1926).

L. R. Io Ex. 76 (Eng., 1875); L. R. 1O Ex. 337 (Eng., 1875); L.
R. x App. Cas. 476 (Eng., 1876). The facts of this case were as follows: The Russian government, desirous of raising a loan on bonds, employed Messrs. Rothschilds as its agents for that purpose in England and in
pursuance of that employment Messrs. Rothschilds issued scrip, pending the
receipt of definitive bonds, in the following form: "Imperial Government of
Russia. Issue of £,ooo,ooo sterling nominal capital in 57o Consolidated Bonds
of 1873; negotiated by Messrs. N. M. Rothschild & Son.s, London, and Messrs.
De Rothschild Brothers, Paris. Bearing interest half-yearly, payable in London from ist December, 1873. Scrip for one hundred pounds stock, No.
Received the sum of twenty pounds, being the first instalment of twenty per
cent. upon one hundred pounds stock; and on payment of the remaining instalments at the periods specified, the bearer will be entitled to receive a definitive
bond or bonds for one hundred pounds after receipt thereof from the Imperial
Government. London, ist December, 1873. (Then followed provisions for the
payment of the instalments, blank receipts for the same when paid, and a warrant for the first periods interest.) N. M. Rothschilds." All the installments
had been paid and the receipts therefor signed. Upon proof of commercial
usage to treat such scrip as a negotiable instrument, transferable by delivery,
the Court of Exchequed held it to be negotiable and this decision was affrmed
by the Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords.
'"In the meantime they themselves (that is, Rothschilds) issue the scrip
and sign the receipt, not signing as agents." Argument of Mr. Benjamin,
counsel for the defendant, L. R. io Ex. at p. 8o. "It is true that Messrs.
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cases are subjected to a detailed comparison and the reasoning of the
English court is carefully examined, there would seem to be every bit
as much ground for this conclusion in the one case as in the other. In
the Goodwin case "the bearer (of the certificate) will be entitled to receive a definitive hond... after receipt thereof from the Imperial Government." By the. instrument in the principal case it is certified "that
the bearer is entitled to receive a bond... when, as, and if delivered
to us... by the Obligor." No words descriptive of an agency appear
in the signatures to either instrument. In both documents, therefore,
the natural meaning of the language imports a personal undertaking
on the part of the banker. In the Goodwin case this argument was
very vigorously pressed upon the court on the appeal to the Exchequer Chamber and Cockburn, C. J., answered (quoting from
Story and Chancellor Kent) that an agent contracting on behalf of a
government is not personally bound because the party contracting
with him is presumed to rely wholly upon the faith and credit of
the government.' The chain of reasoning of the English courts seems
to have been that since Rothschilds in issuing the certificates were
known to be the agents of the Russian government and since, from
the conditional language used in the certificate and the legal principle
that an agent contracting on behalf of a government within the scope
of his agency is not personally bound, Rothschilds were not personally bound thereby to do anything, that the public, therefore, took
the certificates, just as it later took the bonds, wholly on the faith
and credit of the Russian goverment." This reasoning, it is submitted, is just as applicable to the case in hand. The circular of
the bankers made public their agency. And while the contract creating this agency also gave the bankers power to organize and, in effect,
sell the entire bond issue to, a syndicate, yet the certificates were
issued not by this syndicate but by the bankers and as agents. The
public therefore took the certificates, just as it later took the bonds,
wholly on the faith and credit of the Belgian government. Point (c)
would seem to weaken rather than to strengthen the Goodwin case
in that it tends to contradict the agency Uheory of the English court.
If the certificate is considered by itself the fact that the underaking
to pay interest is absolute would tend to show that Rothschilds, themRothschild have signed the document on their own behalf." Cleasby, B., L. R.
1o Ex. at p. 85. The copy of the scrip printed in the statement of the case contained no signature at all and the copy of the bond which immediately fol-

lowed the copy of the scrip contained the signature "Agents N. M. Rothschilds."
'L. R. io Ex. at p. 344.

'Note the language of Cockburn, C. J., L. R. io Ex. at p. 346: "Nor can
we suppose that the persons taking this scrip did so otherwise than through

their faith in the honour of the foreign government, just as they would have
had to trust to it on their afterwards receiving the bonds in lieu of the scrip.
They would then be equally without legal redress against the foreign government and must have trusted to its honour in the fulfilment of its engagements."
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selves, had underwritten the bond issue and intended to bind themselves personally. In making point (d), that the certificates in the
Goodwin case were really themselves a kind of informal bond, the
court seems to have had the opinion that the English court in Goodwin v. Robarts permitted custom to write into the certificates the provisions and incidents of the bonds for which they were later exchanged.0 But the only custom proved in that case was a commercial
usage to treat the certificates as negotiable. And such a theory does
not seem tenable in the light of the later English cases which hold
7
interim certificates calling for non-negotiable stock to be negotiable.
of
purview
the
In deciding that interim certificates come within
the Negotiable Instruments Law and must therefore first satisfy its
prerequisites for negotiability, the thesis of the court is as follows:
Negotiable instruments may be divided into two classes: i. Those
which represent property and give rise to rights in rem, such as warehouse receipts and bills of lading. 2. Those which are promissory
and executory in character and give rise to rights in personam, such
as promissory notes and bills of exchange. Instruments of the second class lie within the purview of the N. L L. and must satisfy its
prerequisites for negotiability, but it is assumed, though not decided,
that those of the first class are without the statute. The interim certificate in question is promissory in all its essential features, is therefore in the second class, and consequently is governed by the N. I. L.
Having once reached this conclusion, the rest is quite simple. The
instrument undertakes that the bearer is entitled to a bond "when, as,
and if delivered to us." It therefore contains no unconditional promnot payable on demand, or at
ise to pay a stun certain in money; ' it is
9
it is dependent upon a contime;
future
determinable
or
fixed
a
tingency; '6 it contains an undertaking to do an act in addition to the
payment of money." It is consequently non-negotiable.
This chain of reasoning seems rather unfortunate. Once it is
admitted-and this point never seems to have been questioned-that
bills of lading and warehouse receipts lie without the purview of the
N. I. L.,"2 then the sweeping provisions of Section I, "An instrument
'Cardozo, J., in the principal case indicates this opinion in thd sentences,
"Doubt, if there was any, as to the meaning of the abbreviated promise (in
the certificate of the Goodwin case), was removed by evidence of the custom
of the market," and "We leave the question open whether custom may write
into "scrip" or other abbreviated forms of contract . . . the terms and incidents of the definitive instruments to be delivered in exchange."
'Rumball v. Metropolitan Bank, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. i94 (Eng., z877);
Webb, Hale & Co. v. Alexandria Water Co., 93 L. T. R. 339, 21 Times L. R.
572 (Eng., 1905).
IN. I. L., § i.
IN. I. L., § i.
" N. I. L., § 4.
"N. I. L., § 5.
Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments, 24 CoL.
L. REV. 563, at p. 592.
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to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements": must
no longer be taken to be all inclusive, as is the natural sense of the
language used, but on the contrary to have a special and restricted
meaning. Instead of meaning "all" it must be taken to mean "some"
instruments. This conclusion seems inescapable. And once this section is admitted to have a restricted meaning it becomes a very nice
problem to determine just what instruments are iucluded and just
what instruments are excluded. There is no test, ear-marked as such,
to be found in the statute. The normal purposes of legislation prepared to secure uniformity would seem to be those of codifying the
existing law, of selecting the better view where the cases were in conflict, and perhaps, in a very limited way, of anticipating possible future conflicts. The N. I. L., however, went further than this since
it quite clearly made several radical changes .inthe law, as it existed
at the time the statute was drafted, in instances where there had been
no conflict among the authorities. Nevertheless it would seem quite
proper that the statute be taken as merely codifying the existing law
save in those instances only where an intention otherwise is dearly
shown. More specifically, the requisites for negotiability listed in the
N. I. L. should not be applied to a type of instrument to which they
had not been previously applied unless clearly required by a strict
construction of the statute. Some light may be thrown on the problem by a comparison with the English act. Their statute, which to
some extent served as a pattern for our own, is expressly restricted
to promissory notes, bills of exchange and checks while the N. I. L.
on its face is all inclusive. This would tend to show that our statute
is intended to have a scope broader at least than that of the English
act.
In view of the uncertainty surrounding the whole subject, however, it seems dogmatic to assert that all negotiable instruments must
fall into either of two classes-i, those representing property and
giving rise to rights in reM; 2, those promissory and executory in
character and giving rise to rights in personam-and that all those in
the second group must satisfy the requisites of the N. I. L. for negotiability. Professor Aigler's view adding a special third class for
interim certificates "sseems more reasonable. - Alluding to the probability that bills of lading and warehouse receipts lie without the scope
of the statute he suggests that Section I (2) of the N. I. L., which
provides that instruments to be negotiable "must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money," be construed as indicating the type of paper covered by the statute, viz., instruments calling for money. 14 The difficulty with this theory is that
bills and notes payable in goods have been held to be non-negotiable

n. 12,
12,

Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments, supra,
at p. 591.

1 Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments, supra, n.
pp. 591-592.
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long before that statute was drafted. 15 This same section, however,
might well be construed as indicating that only such instruments as
undertake to pay a fixed value, with as many units of money or goods
generally as are necessary to aggregate that value, are within the purview of the act. An interim certificate could be distinguished then
since it is more akin to a bill of sale of specified goods, being a contract to pass title to a fully described and predetermined bond at such
time as it may come into being and be received by the banker. The
one type of instrument calls for a "sum certain," being "payable" in
property or money as it may specify. The other type calls for specified property, without special regard to its market value, and is more
precisely "exchangeable" for that property. This view of an interim
certificate seems entirely in line with the opinions of the English justices who passed upon the similar certificate in Goodwin v. Robarts.
"It is the document of title," said Cleasby, B., in the Court of Exchequer,

"...

by virtue of which the person holding it, according to

the terms of it, can call upon the government of Russia to give him
the title to the money, that is, to give him a bond.""' Later in the
House of Lords, Lord Selborne referred to the certificates as "instruments of title to shares in foreign loans." 17
If the proper test of instruments covered by the N. I. L. were,
whether they are promissory and executory in character giving rise to
rights in personam, it is difficult to see why bills of lading and warehouse receipts would not equally come within the purview of the
statute. A bill of lading contains a contract by the carrier to carry
certain goods and to deliver them to order or to bearer at a specified
destination.'" A warehouse receipt contains a contract by the warehouseman to store goods for a specified period and at the end of that
time to deliver them to order or to bearer.' Both instruments seem
promissory and executory in character. Both undertake to pay other
than money and to do an act (to carry and to store the goods, respectively) in addition to the payment of money. Furthermore a bill of
lading is not payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future
time. Both would therefore be non-negotiable under the statute. And
these instruments as a class cannot be distinguished from interim certificates on the ground that they rest upon ancient mercantile custom
since warehouse receipts are a comparatively modern invention,"0
barely senior, if at all, to the interim certificate. All three seem to be
5See, for example, Hodges v. Clinton, I N. C.
for Ioo, payable in tobacco.
"1 R. io Ex. at p. 85.
L. A. I App. Cas. at p. 495.
"DANIEL, NEGoTiA E INSTRUMENTS (6th ed.,
"DANIEL, NEoOTIAnBL IN STRUMENTS (6th ed.,
DANIEL, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed.,

53 (1792), a case of a note

1913) § 1728.
i9x3) § 1713a.
1913) § 1713.
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creatures of commercial necessity developed in turn by the carrier, the
warehouseman, and the banker and performing largely similar functions.

With due respect for the New York Court of Appeals it is submitted, therefore, that the better view would hold interim certificates
to lie without the scope of the N. L L. And once the restrictive atmosphere of this statute is safely left behind, Goodwin v. Robarts and
the cases in its wake are very respectable authorities as to the principles of the law merchant applicable to the problem in hand. An
attempt has been made in the first part of this note to show that the
facts of the principal case bring it within this line of cases. The interim certificates in question could properly have been held to be
negotiable, therefore, upon satisfactory proof of a commercial usage
to treat them as such. The principal case fails only on this proof of
commercial usage and the decision might well have been placed solely
on that ground.
Though the correctness of the decision itself cannot be questioned, the reasoning upon which it is based is disappointing. This
exact problem had only come before the courts of this country twice
before and in both instances does not seem to have been fully and
accurately presented.21 It is one of grave importance. When large
bond issues are floated, whether by a foreign government or a large
corporation, the banker must base his estimates on the present condition of the market and cannot afford to gamble on possible fluctuations in the demand for this type of securities during the time required
for the preparation of the definitive bonds; the government or corporation wants immediate assurance that the money will be forthcoming; the investor demands something that he can pledge or sell
immediately in the same way as the bonds. A fully negotiable interim
certificate is apparently the only solution. The public benefit of a decision affirming the proposition, more and more lost sight of, that
business men of today, as in the past, should be left free to develop
their own law merchant, will hardly be denied. Coming from the
highest court of our great financial center and written by one of the
ablest judges in the country, this opinion, placing the law merchant
even more securely in the straight-jacket prepared for it, is apt to
.In Bowie v. National City Bank, 122 Wash. 269, 210 Pac. 498 (1922),
the interim certificate did not purport on its face to be negotiable and its nonnegotiability seems to have been conceded by counsel. Hearne v. Gillette, 151
La. 79, 89 So. 23 (1922), was decided on the ground that the instrument was
neither a bill or a note, since not a promise to pay money, and neither a bill
of lading or a warehouse receipt, since the person issuing it was not a common
carrier or a warehouseman, and therefore non-negotiable. Babcock v. National
Surety Co., io6 Misc. 149, 175 N. Y. Sup. 432 (N. Y., 1919), went off on
the same narrow interpretation of the N. I. L. as in the principal case. Apparently Goodwin v. Robarts was not presented to the court in any of these
cases.
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have a powerful and unfortunate influence upon future decisions in
other states. It is very difficult to see how the incidents of negotiability can be so far secured by estoppel or by contract as to protect a
purchaser in good faith23from a thief. 2 Apparently the sole remedy
is still more legislation.
B.A.B.

THE MEANING OF "DIRECT Loss OR DAMAGE BY FIRE" IN A
INSURANCE POLICY-The difficulty with which the insurance
company is confronted in describing exactly the contingency against
which it insures is nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in the
use of the phrase "direct loss or damage by fire." A recent case in
Washington I reopens this interesting and difficult problem in the law
of insurance. The facts of the case were as follows:
The plaintiff insured his stock and fixtures against "all direct
loss or damage by fire." In his bakery a sprinkler system had been
installed. Flame from one of his ovens leaped through a crack in
the oven, caused one of the sprinkler heads to melt, and water was
thrown upon the stock. The insurance company denied liability on
the ground that the loss was caused by the sprinkler, and was not a
direct loss by fire. The court, however, permitted recovery on the
policy.
Two questions are raised by the facts of the case:
FIRE

(I)

If it be assumed that the flame leaping from the crack in
the oven was a "fire," in the sense in which the insurance
company insured against fire, was the damage caused by
the sprinkler a "direct loss by fire"?

(2)

Was the escaping flame a fire within the meaning of the
insurance policy?

The answer to the first question must be in the affirmaiive. The
law is clear that where there has been a fire, and damages result
which may be said to have been proximately caused by the fire, the
" There can be no estoppel in the principal case, for example, since the
owner of the certificates did not entrust them to the possession of the thief,
nor did he negligently leave them where they were likely to be stolen.
As to negotiability by contract see American National Bank v. A. G.
Sommerville, Inc., I91 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923).
" It is interesting to note that an act has already been drafted for presentation to the New York Assembly with a view to overruling the decision
in the principal case.

'Pappadakis v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 2V Pac. 641 (Wash., 1926).

NOTES
2
In deciding
damage or loss is regarded as a "direct loss by fire."
when a fire is the remote cause and when the proximate cause of the
loss, the courts have entered into that nebulous field with which
all students of the law of torts are familiar. However, the decisions
on their facts show that, in the instant case, the fire leaping from the
crack in the oven would be generally regarded as the proximate cause
of the injury.
by efforts to put out a
For example-losses which are caused
3
fire are regarded as direct loss by4 fire, as also are losses caused by
removal made necessary by fire and, similarly, losses caused by
thefts after a fire.0 Damage caused by a sprinkler system, in addi-6
tion to the damage by fire, has been held to be a direct loss by fire,
by a short circuit in an electrical sysand so also of damage caused
7
a fire causes an explosion, the
Where
fire.
a
of
result
the
as
tem,
8
resultant loss is regarded as direct loss by fire.
been a fire upon the
has
there
Hence it is apparent that where
premises, and that fire sets other forces in motion, and these forces
cause the injury, the courts are prone to regard the injury as a direct
loss by fire. It is necessary only that the fire be a proximate cause
of the injury. The above review of the decisions indicates that the
flame from the crack in the oven in the principal case would undoubtedly be considered the proximate cause of the injury which
followed.
Thus far it has been assunied that there was a fire in the principal case. Is this a fair assumption? Does an insurance company
pretend to insure against damages caused by a flame from a man's
own oven where no substance has been ignited outside of the oven?
The rule is quite clear that where the fire is confined to the place
where it is supposed to be, and where there is no ignition outside of
that place, there cannot be recovery for such damages as may result,

'For a collection of authorities see 26 C. J.341, note 59. See also, CAM-

ERoN, LAW oF FIR INSURANCE IN CANADA 51 (ipo0), and RIcHARDS, INSURANcE LAW 284 (3d ed., igog) to the effect that "direct" means nothing more

than "proximate."
"Case v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 13 Ill. 676 (1852) ; Cohn v. National Fire
Ins. Co., 96 Mo. App. 315, 70 S. W. 259 (1902).
' Case v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., sufpra, note 3; Independent Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Agnew, 34 Pa. 96 (085g).
'Independent Mut. Ins. Co. v. Agnew, supra, note 4.
'Cohn v. National Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 3.
Lynn Gas Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N. E. 69o

(1893).

"Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co., ii Peters 213 (U. S., 1839).
There is an important exception to the rule in the case of explosions: that the
fire must have extended to the premises of the insured. If the property of the

insured is damaged by an explosion caused by a fire in a nearby property, still
by the flame. Bird v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 224 N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86 (i918);
Liverpool, L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Currie, 234 S. W. 232 (Te., i92x).

there is no recovery unless the premises of the insured were themselves reached
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from smoke and heat.9 If the fire spreads out of the place where
it is confined (there being in a sense a second fire), then of course
any loss which followed would be within the purview of the contract.
The situation we are now considering occupies the middle ground
between these two propositions. The flames were not entirely confined within the oven. At the same time. no substance external to
the oven was ignited by the flames. The only fire was that lighted
for the purposes of the baking shop. Under the earlier cases, no
recovery would be allowed under these facts. The earliest and perhaps the leading case on the subject is that of Austin v. Drew.10 In
that case the building insured was seven or eight stories high. A flue
ran from. the basement to the top story. At each story there was a
register whereby more or less heat could be introduced. One morning the owner's servant forgot to open the register on the highest
story. Sparks, heat and smoke were forced into the lower stories
causing considerable damage. No recovery was permitted, however,
because the fire was normal and was confined within its proper limits.
A fire which emitted sparks throughout the building was not regarded
by the court as a "fire" within the meaning of the policy. In the
instant case, instead of sparks escaping, flame escaped through a
cracked oven. The court regarded this as an accidental, or, to use
the phrase coined by a Massachusetts court, a "hostile" fire." Clearly,
the decisions are irreconcilable.
In Samuels v. Continental Ins. Co.,12 the flame in a lamp flared
up two or three feet above the chimney, and caused damage by throwing off soot and smoke. Nothing was ignited outside of the lamp,
however, and no recovery was allowed on the policy. In Fitzgerald v.
German American Ins. Co.,'3 recovery for damages caused by a
smoking lamp was refused. It does not appear from the facts whether
the flames escaped from the lamp, but the court was of the opinion
that a lighted lamp was not in itself a "fire" within the meaning of the
policy.
It is certainly reasonable to infer from these decisions that a fire,
to come within the policy, must have ignited some substance outside
of the place where the fire was confined. The mere escape of flame,
in the absence of external ignition, would seem to be not nough to
permit recovery. A similar inference may be drawn from Mr.
Wood's treatment of the subject. He says:
'Scripture v. Lowell Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 64 Mass. 356 (1852) ; St. John v.
American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., ii N. Y. 516 (1854); Fitzgerald v. GermanAmerican Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 72, 62 N. Y. Supp. 824 (xg9) ; 4 JOYcE, LAw OF
But see O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co., infra,
INsURANcE 4789 (2d ed., x918).
note 15.
194 Camp. 360 (Eng., 1815).
See Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 67, 74, 43 N. E. 1032,
1033 (x896).
=2 Pa. Dist. 397 (1892).
" Supra,note 9.

-
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"Where fire is employed as an agent, either for the ordinary
purposes of heating the building, for the purposes of manufacture,
or as an instrument of art, the insurer is not liable for the consequences thereof, so long as the fire itself is donfined within the limit
of the agencies employed, as from the effects of smoke or heat evolved
-thereby, or escaping therefrom, from any cause whether intentional
or accidental. In order to bring such consequences within the risk,
there must be actual ignition outside of the agencies employed, not
purposely caused by the assured, and these, as a consequence of such
ignition, dehors the agencies." "
It is thus apparent that many of the authorities would not regard
the flame in the principal- case as a hostile fire, and consequently, not
a basis for recovery on the contract of insurance. Nevertheless,
there are a number of cases which would -permit recovery, some of
them requiring less than appears in the principal case.
O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co. of America' represents the most
extreme view. There the insured was protected against "direct loss
or damage by fire." His servant put into the furnace of the insured's
building some cannel coal, a fuel not intended for that purpose. The
fire raged excessively, filled the house with an unusual degree of
heat, and caused damage by charring, and discoloration from smoke.
Although the fire at no time escaped from the furnace, the court
regarded it as hostile, and allowed recovery. In Way v. Abington
Mut. FireIns. Co.,'6 ignited soot in a chimney was regarded as a fire,
within the meaning of the insurance policy, and recovery was allowed
for the damage caused by smoke. In Singleton v. PhcenirIns. Co.,"T
a boat loaded with quick lime was sunk to prevent its destruction by
fire. The fire was started by the slacking of the lime, and the court
intimated that actual ignition or combustion was not necessary to
establish a loss by fire, and allowed recovery. 8 In Collins v. Del. Ins.
9 the
Co. of Phila.,"
court charged the jury that even though the fire
was confined within a stove, if it spread to a part of the stove where
it was not intended to be, there could be a recovery for the damages
which resulted. It has also been held that the expulsion of live coals
from the furnace upon the floor was enough to make a fire hostile,
although
the fire was not communicated to anything outside of the
20
heater.

161 Woop, FiRE INsuRAxcE 236 (2d ed.,

i886).

is 140 Wis. 388, 122 N. W. 1o38 (1909).
1

Supra, note ii.

i1,32 N. Y. 298, 3o N. E. 839 (1892).
But cf. Western Woolen Mill Co. v. Northern Assurance Co., i39 Fed.
637 (C. C. A., i95).

"9 Pa. Super. 576 (1899).
Cabbell v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 26o S. W. 49o (Mo. App.,
1924).
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From the above review of the cases, 2' it is apparent that the rule
as laid down in the earlier decisions, notably that of Austin v. Drew,
has been broadened by some of the courts to permit recovery even
where no substance external to the agency confining the fire has
been ignited. By way of summary, the following propositions are
advanced as an attempted generality upon the cases reviewed:
(I) The phrase "direct loss or damage by fire" in an insurance
policy will include all losses of which fire is the proximate
cause. This rule is clearly established.
(2)

"Fire" in an insurance policy does not mean fire intentionally lighted for a useful purpose. Unless the fire spreads
and causes actual ignition outside of the stove, furnace,
etc., where it is confined, there can be no recovery for the
damage such a fire may cause. Some courts make an exception in one situation, iz.:

(3) Where an intentionally lighted fire has taken on an extraordinary character, or has behaved in an unusual manner, these
courts will permit recovery for the damage caused, even
though nothing was ignited outside of the place where the
fire was contained.
Proposition (3) is the ever recurrent "doubtful case" in the law
of insurance, which will not permit of categorical treatment. The
fire has been intentionally lighted for a useful purpose, and yet it has
acquired something of an accidental nature. The courts tend to resolve the doubt by leaning in the direction of the insured.
R.D.G.

THE: CONFLICT OF LAwS AS TO FOREIGN

DIVORCES

-The

anomalous situation of a person unmarried in lone state but miarried in
another has again confronted our courts in the two recent cases of
Dean v. Dean 1 and Miller v. Miller.2 The facts of these two cases
are substantially the same. In each, the husband left his wife,
acquired a domicil in a foreign jurisdiction, and there obtained a
divorce on- constructive service of the wife. Upon his return, the
For an exhaustive collection of cases on the subject see Abbott, The

Meaning of Fire in an Insurance Policy Against Loss or Damage by Fire, 24
HAv.L. Rv.iig (igio).
1149 N. E. 844 (N. Y., 1925).

-2o6N. W. 262 (Iowa, 1925).
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3
validity of this divorce was attacked by the wife. In the Dean case,
the majority of the New York court refused to recognize the divorce
obtained in another jurisdiction, but in Miller v. Miller the foreign
decree was held valid. The conflicting decisions illustrate the minority and the majority views respectively.
The Constitution of the United States provides that "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each state to the Public Acts, Records,
4
The Miller decision
and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."
did give full faith and credit to the foreign decree. Did New York
violate this provision of the Constitution in the Dean decision? In
Atherton v. Atherton " the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the invalidation, in New York, of a Kentucky decree, granted on
constructive service to a husband deserted there by his wife who went
to New York, was a violation of the full faith and credit clause. But
in Haddock v. Haddock,G where the husband deserted the wife in New
York, and obtained a divorce valid in Connecticut, it affirmed the New
York courts' refusal to recognize the Connecticut decree, holding that
New York is not bound to give full faith and credit to such a decree.
The decision was by a five to four majority,' and caused considerable
adverse comment.8
The most vulnerable points in Justice White's opinion in the
Haddock case are the propositions: (i) that proper domicil having
been obtained by the plaintiff, personal jurisdiction over the defendant
party will give the state jurisdiction to grant the divorce; and (2) that
the location of the marriage status depends upon the guilt or innocence
of the separating parties. These two propositions show the confusion
of two theories of divorce, a confusion found in many of the New
York decisions. One theory regards divorce as an action on the con-

' In the Dean case the wife was in Canada when the husband got the
divorce in Pennsylvania. Later the husband became domiciled in New York,
and the wife, who had also become domiciled there, sued him for maintenance.
The divorce as granted in Pennsylvania was held not valid as to the wife in
Canada.
'Article IV, i. See also Rev. Stat. 9o5, re-enacting act of May 26, 1790,
C. ii,

I STAT. 122.

'18i U. S. 155 (i9o).
a2oI U. S. 562 (19o5).
' Justice Holmes dissented, claiming that he saw no difference between the
Atherton case and the Haddock case and consequently that the full faith and
credit clause should apply. Justice Brown, also dissenting, saw in the majority view a step back to the narrow confines of comity, a doctrine which the full
faith and credit clause was intended to broaden.
' One of the outstanding critics was J.H. Beale, Jr., in i9H~av. L. REv.
$86 (igo6). Prof. Beale showed some modification in his position in the recent
article, Haddock Revi ited, 39 HARv. L. REV.417 (1926).
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tract of marriage and requires personal service of the defendant to
give the courts jurisdiction over him.9 No court adopts this theory
absolutely.10 The other disregards the contractual element of marriage,
considering it, once performed, as a status or a condition which
society jealously guards. A divorce action has as its subject matter
the marriage status which is a res, and divorce is thus an action in rem.
Once, therefore, jurisdiction is obtained over this res, the court, when
1
a proper plaintiff applies, may serve the defendant constructively.
How jurisdiction is obtained over this res, however, offers one of
the most knotty problems in modem law. There is of course no doubt
that where both parties are domiciled in a given state, its courts have
jurisdiction over the marriage status, and due to the fact that the
legally the head of the family and bears responsibility for
husband -is
its support, he has the control over its physical location, and the wife
must follow where he reasonably leads.22 By a legal fiction, her
domicil follows his when she in fact refuses to move. But where the
husband leaves unjustifiably or forces his wife to leave, she may
establish a separate legal domicil.' 3 It is in these latter situations that
the difficulty begins. Does the marriage status stay with either,
neither, or both? The Haddock case states that if the marriage
status is a res, it is subject to the laws of matter and incapable of
being in two places at the same time. This seems to be open to the
objection that this res is not a corporeal thing, but a condition of
being married, and hence it may very well be in New York with one
spouse, and in Connecticut with the other spouse." The Haddock
case further holds that the innocent party is the one who retains the
"'The contract of marriage cannot be annulled by judicial sanction any
more than any other contract inter partes, without jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant." Jones v. Jones, io8 N. Y. 415, 424; I5N. E. 707 (I888).
"Jurisdictions most strongly influenced by it are New York and North
Carolina. South Carolina permits no divorce. For Pennsylvania view see
Colvid v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 (1867) ; Grossman's Estate, 263 Pa. 139, io6 At.
86 (1919); Duncan v. Duncan, 265 Pa. 464, io9 At. 220 (192o). Pennsylvania will grant divorces on constructive service under Act of 1913, P. L. 191,
Pa. St. 192o, §§ 9158, 9164. Clark v. Clark, 24 Pa. Dist.475 (1914). See also
W. D. Crocker, Recent Divorce Legislation in Pennsylvania as Treated by
Federal Principles of Jurisdiction, 65 U. op PA. L. Rav. (1917). The above
courts follow the minority view.
U This doctrine is followed by the vast majority of jurisdictions including
Wis., etc.
Mass., Ala., Ill.,
" Franklin v. Franklin, igo Mass. "349, 77 N. E. 48 (i906).
"Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 61g (1914). The modern tendency is
to allow the wife to establish a separate domicil even when she deserts the husband.
" J. H. Beale, supra, note 8.

NOTES

marriage status.15 That seems to be untenable because the marriage
status is not an actual thing that may be left or taken but is
merely a condition of being married. It is thus naturally attached
to both.16 And since the defendant is domiciled in Connecticut,
its courts have the right to determine his legal status-in this
case, the marriage status. But, by the nature of marriage, removing
the bonds of matrimony from him ipso facto, removes it from the
wife, for the figure of a wifeless husband or a husbandless wife is
unknown to the law. 7 And so the Connecticut courts really determine the status not only of the person domiciled in Connecticut but
also of the one domiciled in New York. To this New York objects,
even though its objection-seems to threaten the purpose of the full
faith and credit clause.
The New York position seems to be ill taken. That there ought
to be uniformity of law in regard to such an important proceeding as
divorce seems self-evident. The fact that a foreign divorce may be
validin one state and not in another threatens legally remarried men
with indictments of bigamy and adultery, and their legitimate offspring
of the second marriage with bastardization, when the family moves
from the jurisdiction of divorce. The danger of constructive
service, making defendant's appearance unnecessary (frequently the
defendant spouse does not know of the action), opening the door to
fraud, as may have been the fact in the Dean case, is relieved by the
current law that a foreign divorce decree may be attacked when there
is fraud in "allegations and representations designed and intended to
mislead with knowledge of falsity, and resulting in damaging deception." 18 Such proof must be of the most satisfactory sort, because of
19
Requirethe serious nature of invalidation of a decree of divorce.
ments as to considerable length of residence of the libellant or plaintiff within the jurisdiction are quite universal, and in Pennsylvania,
20
where bona fide residence is not required by statute, the trend of
21
There
decisions has rightly been one of demanding such good faith.
'This is supported by L. F. Clinton, The Conflict of Laws as Applied to
Divorce, 7

LAW. AND BANK. 434 (1914).

"M. L. Lewis, Divorce and the Federal Constitution, 49 Amr. L. Rnv. 852
(1915).
"Atherton v. Atherton, supra, note 5.
"Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878), appeal dismissed 131 U. S., appendix
clxiv.
Royal Arcanum v. Carley, 52 N. J. Eq. 642,
Act of 1913, P. L. i91, Pa. St i92o, § 9159.

29

Atl. 813 (1894).

'There is jurisdiction "where the libellant or applicant shall have been a
resident of this Commonwealth for one year previous to the filing of the petition
or libel in divorce." Dulin v. Dulin, 33 Pa. Super. 4 (907), (citing Reed v.
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is left the fear that the courts holding the minority view, that a decree
rendered in another jurisdiction on laws different from those of their
own jurisdiction, violates the policy of protecting one's citizens. The
compromise of the Ohio courts, which acknowledge the divorce as
dissolving the marriage relation, but not as affecting the dower rights
and other property rights of the defendant spouse, offers itself as a
possible solution. 22 The Miller case also suggests the efficacy of
courts of equity for redress to the injured spouse. Finally, there
seems to be no objection to the enforcement of the "full faith and
credit" clause from the social point of view, since if the parties are in
different jurisdictions 2the
marriage has at least socially ceased to be
3
of any practical effect.
D. J.D.
Reed, 3o Pa. Super. 229) : "Our decisions require that it must affirmatively appear that there has been a clear intention to abandon a former residence .
coupled with an actual bona fide residence for one year."
'Doerr v. Forsythe, So Ohio 726, 35 N. E. io55 (1893). Accord: Iowa,
and Minnesota.
'BIsHoP,

MARIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, §' 137 (i8gi).

